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ASBESTOS ACHIEVEMENTS
Anita Bemstein*
The fraught subject of asbestos liability offers little space for
disputatious participants and commentators to come together. What little
consensus on the subject exists tends to focus on dollars. The blandest
generalization one can make about asbestos liability is that it has caused,
and will continue to cause, a lot of money to be paid out. Researchers have
estimated that by 2002 asbestos liability had amounted to more than $70
billion and had driven more than 75 corporations into bankruptcy;1 they
anticipate that between 2002 and the end of liability, perhaps fifty years
hence, another sum between $130 billion and $195 billion would join the
current $70 billion expended.2  This liability has spread its effects far
beyond the dozens of bankrupted businesses, causing secondary losses to
the economy amounting to hundreds of billions of dollars.3
Another generalization--only slightly less widely shared than the
first-laments the failure of asbestos disputants to agree on a compensation
scheme in place of liability. The costly mechanism of personal injury
litigation caused the above-referenced money to be expended while giving
injured persons only a tiny fraction (when secondary losses to the American
economy are included in the denominator) of these billions.4  Once it
became clear that asbestos suppliers ought to be held responsible for the
harms of their product,5 public law-statutes and regulation-could in
* Anita and Stuart Subotnick Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law School. I thank Cynda
D'Hondt for research assistance, Alexandra Lahav for editorial advice, and Aaron Twerski for
insightful comments on a draft.
1. STEPHEN J. CARROLL ET AL., ASBESTOS LITIGATION 92-97 (RAND Inst. for Civil Justice
2005) [hereinafter RAND REPORT].
2. Id. at 105-06.
3. Id. at 121-23.
4. The fraction becomes tiny only when the secondary losses to the economy are counted.
Before then, it is merely small: Transaction costs account for about two-thirds of moneys spent.
RAND REPORT, supra note 1, at 104-05.
5. PAUL BRODEUR, OUTRAGEOUS MISCONDUCT: THE ASBESTOS INDUSTRY ON TRIAL 10-
18, 34-36 (1985) (summarizing hazards and what the industry knew of them); RAND REPORT,
supra note 1, at 22.
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principle have forced some cost internalization on the heedless asbestos
business while achieving compensation at a lower price.6 Just a few years
before Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Products Corp.7 launched the modem era
of liability for asbestos injury, Congress had taken a public-law path by
taxing industry to establish an insurance fund that paid for pneumoconiosis
("black lung disease"), the signature harm suffered by coal miners! The
social problem of asbestos-related injury, much more costly and
complicated than pneumoconiosis, has so far escaped legislative resolution,
and the defeat of the Fairness in Asbestos Injury Resolution Act of 2005
probably marked the end of hope for a congressional reprieve. 9
With this lament about the rise of liability and the fall of a legislative
solution established, transaction costs come into view, and the next
generalization notes that asbestos liability has been a source of fabulous
wealth for plaintiffs' lawyers. Some who utter this generalization call
asbestos plaintiffs' lawyers greedy and over-enriched, and their gains ill-
gotten.10 One authority on the asbestos litigation, a participant in this
Symposium, began an article with a familiar invocation of manic excess:
"Over the past several years," wrote Deborah Hensler in 2005,
asbestos litigation has become the 'poster child' for the tort reform
movement in the United States. Asbestos litigation is frequently described
as an entirely non-meritorious litigation, driven by greedy plaintiff
attorneys who seek only to line their own pockets and by greedy plaintiffs
who have crowded onto the gravy train to easy money. 1
6. Michael Green, A Future for Asbestos Apportionment?, 12 CONN. INS. L.J. 315, 317
(2006) [hereinafter Green, Asbestos Apportionment] (observing that "asbestos is a poster child for
a legislatively-enacted compensation scheme").
7. 493 F.2d 1076 (5th Cir. 1974).
8. See 30 U.S.C. §§ 901-45 (2004).
9. Jeb Barnes, Legislative Inertia and Court-Based Tort Reform in the Case of Asbestos, 28
JUST. SYS. J. 157, 158 (2007).
10. Lester Brickman, An Analysis of the Financial Impact of S. 852: The Fairness in Asbestos
Injury Resolution Act of 2005, 21 CARDOZO L. REv. 991, 995 (2005) [hereinafter Brickman,
Fairness]; Trial Lawyers Getting Rich Off of Asbestos Claims, Hatch Says, U.S. FED. NEWS, Feb.
9, 2006 (quoting a U.S. senator: "Too many people have died, too many people have lost their
jobs, and too many asbestos attorneys have private jets because of the existing asbestos litigation
nightmare."); see also Susan K. Livio, Johns-Manville Deal to Boost Cancer Trust, NEWARK
STAR-LEDGER, June 24, 2000, at A15 (blaming "exorbitant attorneys' fees" for depleting an
asbestos fund). For stronger rhetoric, see Thomas Grillo, After 8 Years, a Milestone in Battle over
Mold, BOSTON GLOBE, Nov. 25, 2003, at AI ("greedy lawyers looking for the next cash cow as
asbestos lawsuits diminish."); Stuart Taylor Jr., The Greedy vs. The Sick: Lawyers are Using
Asbestos Claims to Cheat the Rest of Us, LEGAL TIMES, Sept. 30, 2002, at 60.
11. Deborah R. Hensler, Asbestos Litigation in the United States: Triumph and Failure of the
Civil Justice System, 12 CONN. INS. L.J. 255, 255 (2005).
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The nearby footnote cites two Wall Street Journal editorials, among many
that attacked the asbestos plaintiffs' lawyers.
Moving out of consensus land, we consider now a widely (though not
universally) shared condemnation of these advocates. Asbestos gains are
ill-gotten, commentators say, not only because they are indecently large but
because lawyers accreted their wealth by dishonest means. Critics have
denounced lawyers who suborned perjury,' 2 retained clients whose interests
they knew were in conflict,' 3 garnered their "inventory"' 4 in violation of
professional responsibility rules,15 mendaciously equated mere exposure
with injury, and directed corruptible physicians and other medical experts to
lie about how ill their clients were.'
6
This view regards asbestos litigation as pathological in origin,
deviating from an ideal. The old-school, benign "traditional medical
model," as summarized by the incisive critic Lester Brickman, permits
personal injury litigation to be launched only after "a wrongfully injured
person sees a doctor to treat his or her illness or injury and then seeks out a
lawyer.' 7 Asbestos plaintiffs' lawyers have scorned this honorable path.
Their "entrepreneurial model of asbestos liability," in worrisome contrast to
the traditional model, impels lawyers to "recruit plaintiffs, who are usually
unaware of any injury and lack any symptoms or lung impairment . . "8
Brickman identifies six features of the dreaded model as applied to
asbestos: (1) "a massive client recruitment effort," which screened perhaps
a million former industrial workers, most of them asymptomatic and
unlikely to contract any asbestos-related injury in the future; (2) "the
manufacture of specious medical evidence;" (3) "entrepreneurial witness
preparation techniques" that elicit false testimony; (4) an extraordinary
number of filed claims; (5) settlement strategies that perversely help to
12. Walter Olson, Thanks for the Memories, Overlawyered.com, June 1998,
http://www.overlawyered.com/articles/olson/memories.html; but see W. William Hodes, The
Professional Duty to Horseshed Witnesses-Zealously, Within the Bounds of the Law, 30 TEX.
TECH. L. REv. 1343, 1354 (1999) (arguing that helping a client remember brand names on
asbestos packages that he last saw decades ago does not necessarily create false testimony).
13. Lester Brickman, Ethical Issues In Asbestos Litigation, 33 HOFSTRA L. REv. 833, 846-53
(2005) [hereinafter Brickman, Ethical Issues].
14. One federal appellate opinion condemning a plaintiffs' lawyer for breaching his fiduciary
duties to his asbestos clients used this phrase with little irony. See Huber v. Taylor, 469 F.3d 67,
70 (3d Cir. 2006).
15. Brickman, Ethical Issues, supra note 13, at 847-49.
16. Lester Brickrnan, Disparities Between Asbestos and Silicosis Claims Generated by
Litigation Screenings and Clinical Studies, 29 CARDOZO L. REv. 513, 518 (2007) (accusing
plaintiffs' lawyers of having presented false medical data in support of personal injury claims).
17. Brickman, Fairness, supra note 10, at 997.
18. Id.
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finance new claims rather than make the litigation go away; and (6) the
relocation of these behaviors and strategies to bankruptcy courts, where
insolvent defendants have found no real haven.' 9 Other observers also
denounce lawyerly initiative on the plaintiffs' side of the asbestos caption."0
In this Article, I endeavor to set the record straighter than it now
stands, by praising the "entrepreneurial lawyering" that has faced such
unremitting and harsh criticism. 2' I do not thereby write on a blank slate.
Other commentators have rendered praise to asbestos liability. Decades
ago, Paul Brodeur published a monograph to say that liability brought to
light the "outrageous misconduct" of asbestos suppliers who, knowing that
exposure to their product was dangerous, failed to warn vulnerable
workers.22 The products liability scholar Marshall Shapo has observed that
asbestos liability effected enhancements for "the fund of social knowledge,
and, ultimately, for consumer welfare. 23 My contribution here, rooted in
my own specialization in torts and professional responsibility, is to credit
plaintiffs' lawyers for the innovative changes to tort doctrine that they
helped install.
The prevailing commentary that insists on a contrary stance-
extending to these lawyers little more than grudging admiration for having
made themselves rich, along with a heaping helping of scom for their
ethics-does not give these achievers their due. Even if some asbestos
lawyers deserve criticism or punishment for dishonesty in their advocacy (a
claim that I take seriously but do not explore in this Article), they also
deserve recognition for their loyalty to their clients and their dogged pursuit
of better doctrine. I commend what zealous advocacy has made possible. 4
These consequences extend well beyond merely these lawyers' winning in
court and making money: they show promise of making personal injury law
work better for other groups of plaintiffs.
19. Id. at 997-1000.
20. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Class Wars: The Dilemma of the Mass Tort Class Action, 95
COLUM. L. REV. 1343, 1358-59 (1995); Robert A. Kagan, On Surveying the Whole Legal Forest,
28 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 833, 844 n.14 (2003); James L. Stengel, The Asbestos End-Game, 62
N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 223, 238 (2006).
21. On "entrepreneurial" as an ironic pejorative when written by those who side with
business defendants, see Anita Bernstein, The Enterprise of Liability, 39 VAL. U. L. REV. 27, 33
(2004).
22. BRODEUR, supra note 5, at 45 (linking Borel to revelations about industry knowledge).
23. Marshall S. Shapo, Millennial Torts, 33 GA. L. REV. 1021, 1031 (1999) (summarizing
some consequences of asbestos litigation).
24. For elaboration on these views, see Anita Bernstein, The Zeal Shortage, 34 HOFSTRA L.
REV. 1165 (2006).
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I. PROCEDURAL VICTORIES
After Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Products Corp.25 opened the strict-
liability gates, lawyers for prospective plaintiffs who had been exposed to
asbestos at work but had not suffered physical impairments faced
difficulties. Doctrine frustrated them at several turns. They could file a
personal-injury action promptly, if only their client had an injury.2 6 Or they
could wait until an asbestos-related injury emerged, even though in his own
view each exposed person was harmed now, tormented by the sword-of-
Damocles latency of his encounter with poison. Persons exposed to
asbestos needed legal advice immediately, but the contingent-fee tradition
of American personal injury law does not offer those who do not yet have a
claim any mechanism to pay for it. A plaintiff would receive at least a
sense of solidarity, and perhaps material gain, if he could join other exposed
workers in a class, but class action doctrine demands more commonality
27among members than having been exposed to the same toxin.
"If I were having a philosophical talk with a man I was going to have
hanged," Oliver Wendell Holmes once wrote, "I should say ... we propose
to sacrifice you to the common good. You may regard yourself as a soldier
dying for your country if you like. But the law must keep its promises.',2 8
One need not be so unreceptive to personal-injury claims as Holmes was to
fill in "a philosophical talk" informing our plaintiff of where he
unfortunately stands. Tort law purports to recognize injury, rather than
inchoate wrong: that a supplier of asbestos negligently put a dangerous
product into commerce will not suffice to create an actionable harm.29 State
legislatures enact short statutes of limitations for negligence claims because
they are concerned about fairness to defendants, the unreliability of human
memory, the deterioration of evidence, and the poor fit between long-gone
occurrences and current experience. 30  As for this person's inability to
25. 493 F.2d 1076 (5th Cir. 1974).
26. See DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS 1 (2000) (noting the centrality of injury in
defining the meaning of "tort").
27. See Peter A. Drucker, Class Certification and Mass Torts: Are "'Immature" Tort Claims
Appropriate for Class Action Treatment?, 29 SETON HALL L. REv. 213, 215-16 (1998)
(suggesting that the answer to the author's question is no).
28. Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. to Harold J. Laski dated December 17, 1925, in
HOLMES-LASKI LETTERS: THE CORRESPONDENCE OF MR. JUSTICE HOLMES AND HAROLD J.
LASKI 1916-1935 806 (Mark DeWolfe Howe ed., 1953).
29. Drucker, supra note 27, at 216.
30. DOBBS, supra note 26, at 551-52. It is fair to say, as did one court, that for claims
involving latent disease the quality of evidence tends to improve rather than deteriorate as time
passes. Wilson v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 684 F.2d 111, 119 (D.C. Cir. 1982). But any
legislature could fix this anomaly if it so desired.
2008]
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afford legal advice: he inhaled poison on the job; perhaps his union will
find him a lawyer. If not, his lack of counsel joins the other deprivations of
his working-class life. 31 Paid-for legal aid in the United States has been
reserved mostly for individuals who face loss of liberty; it does not
underwrite personal injury claims. Class certification or other aggregation?
No. Courts cannot regard asbestos injury as shared within a group of
litigants when, for most of them, no injury has occurred.
Nobody kept prospective litigants from the courts with a Holmesian
philosophical talk; nor did claimants have to compete over public funds.
Instead, judges changed the rules to welcome litigation. Persons
unimpeded by injury brought personal injury claims that were not dismissed
for failure to state a cause of action. Discovery of harm replaced instances
of tortious conduct as the point at which causes of action accrued. Courts
facilitated aggregation of claims, rescuing contentions that might have
failed in isolation.32  These successes against the conventional
"philosophical talk" could not have occurred without aggressive and adroit
lawyering.
A. Recasting Injury
Clarence Borel, who suffered from asbestosis and then died of
mesothelioma, or what the court misleadingly called a form of lung cancer,
before winning his Fifth Circuit victory,33 differed from most of the
asbestos plaintiffs in that he had experienced an injury attributed to the
toxic product to which he was exposed.34 Borel brought an injured cohort
of asbestos workers to American liability doctrine. Over the years the
majority of Mr. Borel's successor-plaintiffs have been, in the peculiar
31. Cf Jonathan R. Macey, Mandatory Pro Bono: Comfort for the Poor or Welfare for the
Rich?, 77 CORNELL L. REv. 1115, 1116 (1992) (arguing that the poor lack legal services "because
they are rational. Given their limited wealth, the poor simply would rather spend their money on
other things. In other words, legal services are very, very low on a poor person's shopping list.
Food is higher. Shelter is higher. Clothing is higher.").
32. RAND REPORT, supra note 1, at 28-33. Moreover, while the Supreme Court's settlement
decisions in the 1990s defeated class certification for many asbestos claimants, see, e.g., Amchem
Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 628-29 (1997); Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815,
864 (1999), other aggregations remained, giving plaintiffs more collectively than "what individual
trials would yield." Lester Brickman, On the Relevance of the Admissibility of Scientific
Evidence: Tort System Outcomes are Principally Determined by Lawyers' Rates of Return, 15
CARDOZO L. REv. 1755, 1784 (1994).
33. LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, AMERICAN LAW IN THE 2 0 TH CENTURY 367 (2002).
34. The point is controversial, see RAND REPORT, supra note 1, at 76, and rests in part on
how one defines an injury. Here, I follow the RAND convention and focus on impairment, in the
sense of an impediment to daily living. Id. at 7.
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jargon of asbestos liability, "unimpaired. '35  An adjective that means
"lacking an injury" went on to modify a noun meaning "person entitled to
claim that he has an injury. 36
Asbestos liability also introduced the "inactive docket., 37 A docket is
supposed to mean a list of "causes for trial" 38-- causes that are active in that
they are pending: "on the docket," according to the Oxford English
Dictionary, means "in hand; under consideration.,, 39 The inactive docket,
however, consists of cases that are not under consideration. Also known as
a deferred docket or a pleural registry, this innovation allows uninjured
plaintiffs to obtain an index number and preserve their asbestos claims from
dismissal on statute of limitations grounds.
In contemporary asbestos litigation, plaintiffs' lawyers oppose the
inactive docket because it includes no mechanism to pay them for their
personal-injury advocacy on behalf of people who have no injury.40 They
spend much time and effort trying to pull their clients' names from this
roster. Meanwhile, their adversaries on the defense side heap praise on this
innovation.41 My recognition of achievement by advocates for asbestos
plaintiffs thus diverges from these partisan assessments.
That the winning side feels defeated, and the losing side vindicated or
at least relieved, by the rise of inactive dockets shows how the plaintiffs'
bar succeeded in moving the entitlements-and-expectations goalposts. The
law's ordinary response to a personal injury claim that lacks a personal
injury is to eject it, not to recognize it with a docket entry. In the words of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (echoed in state provisions for
demurrer and the like), judges dismiss such an action "for failure to state a
claim upon which relief can be granted. 42 The inactive docket, established
to provide prompt relief should a plaintiff later develop an asbestos-linked
35. See id. The first case to recognize an unimpaired plaintiff was Bernier v. Raymark
Industries, Inc., 516 A.2d 534 (Me. 1986).
36. RAND REPORT, supra note 1, at 7.
37. Id. at 26.
38. 4 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 912 (J.A. Simpson & E.S.C. Weiner, eds., 2d ed.
1989).
39. Id.
40. RAND REPORT, supra note 1, at 26.
41. See Mark A. Behrens & Manuel Lopez, Unimpaired Asbestos Dockets: They Are
Constitutional, 24 REv. LITIG. 253, 262-64 (2006); Mark A. Behrens & Monica G. Parham,
Stewardship for the Sick: Preserving Assets for Asbestos Victims Through Inactive Docket
Programs, 33 TEX. TECH. L. REv. 1, 6-7 (2001); Victor E. Schwartz et al., Addressing the
"Elephantine Mass" of Asbestos Cases: Consolidation Versus Inactive Dockets (Pleural
Registries) and Case Management Plans That Defer Claims Filed by the Non-Sick, 31 PEPP. L.
REv. 271, 276 (2003).
42. FED. R. CIv. P. 12(b)(6).
20081
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injury, and to remove the impediment of legislated limitations on the time
to bring suit, elevates this subset of personal injury claims.
Now that asbestos lawyers have made the injury requirement more
flexible, rather than a rigid on-off binary, it becomes possible to envision
inactive dockets for other types of claims. Lead paint offers an example.
The New England Journal of Medicine has said that sixteen percent of
American children "have been mentally and neurologically damaged
because of exposure" to this toxic substance.43 Courts could permit pre-
injury filing and then wait to see whether children exposed to lead develop
brain injuries, meanwhile keeping the entities that they might choose to sue
(paint makers, other manufacturers, builders, landlords, government
housing programs, schools) on the liability hook. The project is a daunting
one, but after the achievements of asbestos lawyers, it has become
imaginable.
B. Reform of the Single Action and Discovery Rules
Before asbestos liability, courts had held plaintiffs to a single action
rule that barred the splitting of causes of action, the better to forestall
"vexatious and repetitive litigation. 44 Initiative from asbestos lawyers set
plaintiffs free to prosecute litigation that defendants, and perhaps judges,
would regard as vexatious and repetitive-to complain first about lesser
harms like pleural thickening or asbestosis and later about mesothelioma.
One student commentator, noting that asbestos has marked the foremost
exception to the single action rule, observes that courts "have almost
universally rejected this interpretation in asbestos cases" but declines to
give credit where credit is due: the reason for this more favorable treatment
of asbestos claims, according to the author, is "probably [that] the ultimate
injury (cancer) was not a progression of the injury at the time of suit
(asbestosis). 45
Unlikely, given that many courts have recognized a cause of action for
46 l' taincreased risk of cancer, a claim that relies on an implicit notion ofprogression. Personal injury doctrine does not indulge hypochondriacs who
43. Katha Pollitt, Fetal Rights, Women's Wrongs, in REASONABLE CREATURES: ESSAYS ON
WOMEN AND FEMINISM 169, 184 (1995).
44. James A. Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski, Asbestos Litigation Gone Mad: Exposure-
Based Recovery for Increased Risk, Mental Distress, and Medical Monitoring, 53 S.C. L. REV.
815, 819 (2002) (citations omitted).
45. Note, Latent Harms and Risk-Based Damages, 111 HARv. L. REV. 1505, 1510 n.32
(1998).
46. Henderson & Twerski, supra note 44, at 822-23.
[Vol. 37
ASBESTOS A CHIE VEMENTS
suppose nothing more than that they will become gravely ill with something
or other in the future,47 and that whichever defendant they name should pay
for it. Courts could accept asbestosis and pleural thickening as harbingers
of cancer to come only because they saw a relation between the two
manifestations.
Increased risk of cancer has now left the landscape; courts have
concluded that abolishing the single action rule can do the same work, and
with more analytic clarity.4 8 Indeed, these two theories of responsibility for
injury are mutually inconsistent. If exposure to asbestos causes asbestosis
in the twentieth year after exposure ("year 20"), followed by mesothelioma
ten years after that ("year 30"), for example, then courts can award
compensation for mesothelioma either in year 20, with reference to
increased risk, or in year 30, when the more severe disease has manifested.
But not in both year 20 and year 30: that would constitute double recovery.
Nevertheless, both the year-20 and the year-30 perspectives have succeeded
in separate actions, as well as the inactive-docket approach, which
welcomes plaintiffs into court long before year 20 while also preserving
their year-20 and year-30 entitlements. 49 The claims have flourished at a
range of development points. And so we remain in need of a better account
than the no-progression explanation for the unique strength of asbestos
claims against what had been a daunting single-action barrier.
The most parsimonious explanation is that asbestos litigants defeated
adverse doctrine because judges were moved by the substantive justice of
their demands. Courts recognized the validity of early filing (i.e. for
exposure only), middling filing (for asbestosis or pleural thickening), and
late filing (for cancer). Lawyers with unexceptional levels of talent and
energy would have advised their clients to accept with resignation these
claim-thwarting procedural rules, or failed to argue effectively for doctrinal
change. Asbestos advocates, by contrast, told a compelling story about all
stages of their clients' encounters with poison.
Plaintiffs' lawyers won a related victory when they persuaded courts to
turn on the limitation clock at a time they favored. For most personal-
injury plaintiffs, causes of action accrue at the time that human bodies are
harmfully touched. 50  For asbestos, under current understandings of
limitation rules, accrual does not commence until victims discover their
47. 4 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 573 (J.A. Simpson & E.S.C. Weiner, eds., 2d ed. 1989)
(defining hypochondria as "[a] morbid state of mind, characterized by general depression,
melancholy, or low spirits, for which there is no real cause").
48. See Henderson & Twerski, supra note 44, at 822.
49. See supra text accompanying notes 30-33.
50. See Robinson v. Weaver, 550 S.W.2d 18, 19 (Tex. 1977).
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harm, with discovery leniently construed. 51 This judicial generosity is not
unique to asbestos, but asbestos cases are prominent in the annals of
reprieve. Courts have, for instance, held that knowledge about asbestos
exposure did not constitute discovery for purposes of a mesothelioma
claim,52 and that the judicially recognized extension of a limitation period
based on time of discovery must benefit only asbestos plaintiffs.53
The time-of-discovery approach to accrual looks like an
uncontroversial instance of common sense mixed with sympathy for an
injured person, but before the successes of asbestos litigation, courts really
did expect a plaintiff to sue before he could know he was injured. Judge
Jerome Frank wrote a famous dissent complaining that this dominant stance
said, in effect, that "you [can] die before you are conceived, . . . be divorced
before ever you marry,... harvest a crop never planted,... burn down a
house never built, . .. [and] miss a train running on a non-existent
railroad., 54  He accused his colleagues who held otherwise of living in
"topsy-turvy land., 55 But Judge Frank was outvoted--even in 1952, years
after the Supreme Court had endorsed a time-of-discovery accrual rule in a
FELA case.56
While asbestos lawyers were solidifying their time-of-discovery
victory, courts were declining to extend it to other types of claims. For
example, young women who learned that their reproductive organs were
damaged by DES, a toxin that their mothers had ingested during pregnancy,
illustrated the discovery problem in classic terms. DES and asbestos are
similar toxins in two pertinent respects. First, the injurious effects of both
substances take years to manifest, thus presenting to courts this discovery
issue. Second, once manifested, some of these injurious effects-asbestosis
and mesothelioma for asbestos, clear cell adenocarcinoma for DES-have a
51. See, e.g., Rose v. A.C. & S., Inc., 796 F.2d 294, 297 (9th Cir. 1986) (holding that the
cause of action did not accrue until the plaintiff knew not only about the illness but the identity of
the manufacturer); Karjala v. Johns-Manville Prod. Corp., 523 F.2d 155, 159-60 (8th Cir. 1975)
(approving a jury instruction telling jurors they were free to determine the time at which plaintiff
should have realized he had a claim for his longstanding asbestosis).
52. Wilson v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 684 F.2d 111, 116 (D.C. Cir. 1982); Sopha v.
Owens-Coming Fiberglas Corp., 601 N.W.2d 627, 635-36 (Wis. 1999).
53. Pustejovsky v. Rapid-American Corp., 35 S.W. 3d 643, 653 (Tex. 2000); see also Bruce
J. McKee, Alabama: A Jurisdiction Out of Control?, 41 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv. 637, 641 (1997)
(noting that Alabama statutory law refuses to recognize the discovery rule except for two types of
claims, fraud and asbestos).
54. Dincher v. Marlin Firearms Co., 198 F.2d 821, 823 (2d Cir. 1952) (Frank, J., dissenting)
(citations omitted). Judge Frank was objecting to the application of a Connecticut statute of
limitation.
55. Id.
56. See Urie v. Thompson, 337 U.S. 163, 170 (1949).
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"signature" association with the toxin in question.57 Because the harms
associated with both DES and asbestos almost never happen to an
unexposed person, the passage of years does not impair the quality of
evidence that the plaintiff holds, as it might in a personal injury claim that
does not feature a signature harm.
Many DES victims sought legal counsel as soon as they knew they
were injured and, like Tom Urie of FELA fame, tried to file suit promptly.
They did not delay in learning about the link between maternal DES and
their physical anomalies, either. Lawyers turned them away, citing the
statute of limitations. 58
In one of the many decisions that freed asbestos plaintiffs from the
"single action" characterization of a limitation period,59 the Wisconsin
Supreme Court reviewed earlier holdings on this issue.60 The first plaintiff
in Wisconsin to win the favor of a discovery rule had been a woman injured
by the Dalkon Shield contraceptive, but other litigants had fared less well.6'
One Wisconsin litigant learned that her cause of action had accrued when
she received a blood transfusion that impaired her fertility, not when her
infertility manifested itself.62 Another plaintiff needed years to connect her
disabling emotional distress to her having been molested by a priest,
coupled with negligence by the Archdiocese of Milwaukee, in years past:
63
too bad.
The success of asbestos lawyers is manifest also by their having won
over judges, rather than needing to plead their cause to statute-rewriters.
Spurred into activism in New York, a redoubt of early "time of injury"
deadlines, some DES claimants joined with other reformers to lobby the
state legislature for help.64 They did not win the discovery rule that their
counterparts had achieved so easily in asbestos litigation, but did get the
lesser measure of a revival statute, a special new law that gave them a year
57. On signature effects, see FAQ, DES Action, available at
http://www.desaction.org/faq.htm (noting that clear cell adenocarcinoma "is practically
nonexistent in non-exposed women"); Michelle J. White, Why the Asbestos Genie Won 't Stay in
the Bankruptcy Bottle, 70 U. CIN. L, REv, 1319, 1319 (2002) (identifying asbestosis and
mesothelioma as signature diseases). See also infra notes 71-74 (reviewing evidence about
asbestos-related signature effects).
58. See Anita Bernstein, Markets of Mothers: Hymowitz v. Eli Lilly & Co., in TORTS
STORIES 151, 163 (Robert L. Rabin & Stephen D. Sugarman eds., 2003).
59. Sopha v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp., 601 N.W.2d 627, 636 (Wis. 1999).
60. Id.
61. See Hansen v. A.H. Robins, Inc., 335 N.W.2d 578, 583 (Wis. 1983).
62. See Olson v. St. Croix Valley Mem'l Hosp. Inc., 201 N.W.2d 63, 65 (Wis. 1972),
overruled by Hansen v. A.H. Robins, Inc., 335 N.W.2d 578 (Wis. 1983).
63. See Pritzlaffv. Archdiocese of Milwaukee, 533 N.W. 2d 780, 785 (Wis. 1995).
64. See Singer v. Eli Lilly & Co., 549 N.Y.S.2d 654, 655 (App. Div. 1990).
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to file what otherwise would have been stale claims.65 Courts have held
plaintiffs tightly to the narrow terms of this reprieve.66 Another class of
delayed-discovery plaintiffs, sexual abuse claimants, also failed in court and
had to resort to lobbying.67
Elsewhere, in a review of this time-of-discovery line of cases, I explore
the possibility that judicial favoritism for male claimants over female ones
could explain the contrast between these asbestos victories and the rejection
of women's claims as time-barred.68 For present purposes, I do not press
that contention, and would say that even if sexism was necessary for the
successes of asbestos plaintiffs and their lawyers, it could not have been
sufficient: Asbestos lawyers got rid of unwanted doctrine that had burdened
many men. Eloquent and dogged advocacy established the injustice of
topsy-turvy land barriers to otherwise meritorious claims.
II. PROVING WHAT CAUSED MESOTHELIOMA
Here we move away from the unimpaired plaintiffs who occupy most
of Part I. Impaired plaintiffs (a minority of asbestos claimants) brought
actions for a variety of diseases, predominantly asbestosis, mesothelioma,
and lung cancer.69 They won favorable outcomes on the causation criterion
that personal injury law could extend to other plaintiffs who allege that
another defective product hurt them.70  Reserving for the next part my
discussion of asbestosis and lung cancer claims, which raise a separate
issue, I consider mesothelioma here.
65. See id.
66. For example, the revival statute was a condition precedent, rather than an adjustment to
the statute of limitations, as one New York appellate court admonished a plaintiff who tried to sue
after attaining majority, and so was not subject to tolling. See id.
67. Rosemarie Ferrante, Note, The Discovery Rule: Allowing Adult Survivors of Childhood
Sexual Abuse the Opportunity for Redress, 61 BROOK. L. REv. 199, 216-17 (1995) (summarizing
developments following the failure of a leading personal injury claim, Tyson v. Tyson, 727 P.2d
226 (Wash. 1986)). Legislative extensions of time to file claims, bearing the markers of
compromise, frequently add burdens to plaintiffs in exchange for the boon of later accrual. See
Singer, 549 N.Y.S.2d at 655-56.
68. See Anita Bernstein, Fellow-Feeling in the Law of Personal Injury 210 (unpublished
manuscript, on file with the Southwestern University Law Review). In Clay v. Kuhl, 727 N.E.2d
217, 222 (Il. 2000), a plaintiff alleging sexual abuse argued that she was situated similarly to an
asbestos plaintiff and should receive the same leniency for her delay in filing. The court rejected
her contention. Id. at 222-23.
69. Here I observe the RAND convention that pleural thickening does not constitute an
impairment, although it can have symptomatic effects.
70. See supra Part I.A.
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A. The Background Challenge for Mesothelioma: Judges Skeptical About
the Asserted Connection between an Antecedent and a Consequence
Rarely today does one hear anybody question whether asbestos really
does cause the lung diseases for which plaintiffs have recovered in the
courts. Acclaimed studies in the early 1960s by the Mount Sinai physician-
researcher Irving Selikoff settled the issue for many observers. 71  Even
conservative commentators inclined to resist other plaintiffs' claims about
toxicity have spared asbestos plaintiffs their usual "junk science" doubts.72
A range of lung diseases are associated with exposure to this substance.
Focusing at first on asbestosis, Selikoff found a strong correlation between
asbestos exposure and this condition; he also observed plenty of cancer
among asbestos workers.73 Mesothelioma almost never occurs absent
asbestos exposure; it is, or is at least very close to, what epidemiologists
call a signature disease.74
That said, asbestos plaintiffs who can establish the other elements of a
personal injury claim-i.e. that (if negligence is the cause of action) the
defendant supplier owed them a duty of care and breached that duty by
failing to warn them of hazards, or that (using strict liability) the defendant
supplier put a defective product into the stream of commerce-still have to
show causation of the harm they suffered. The conventional wisdom that
being exposed to asbestos gives you lung disease will not suffice in court.
Evidentiary rules limit the admissibility of testimony purporting to establish
a relation between exposure to a substance and the effect about which a
litigant complains.
71. See The History of a Deadly Mineral, [CLEVELAND] PLAIN DEALER, Nov. 4, 2002, at A5
(providing a timeline, on which the Selikoff studies are prominent). But see Joseph Hooper, The
Asbestos Mess, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 25, 1990, at 38 (reporting newer studies inconsistent with
Selikoff's findings).
72. David E. Bernstein, Keeping Junk Science Out of Asbestos Litigation, 31 PEPP. L. REV.
11, 28 (2003) [hereinafter Bernstein, Junk Science] (finding very little "junk science"); Steven B.
Hantler et al., Is the "Crisis" in the Civil Justice System Real or Imagined?, 38 LOY. L.A. L. REV.
1121, 1151-52 (2005) (confining criticisms of asbestos liability to the inclusion of peripheral
defendants). In his polemic against "junk science," which he sees as having warped American
liability in a plaintiff-favoring direction, Peter Huber has kind words for asbestos liability, saying
that "good science" underlies claims for the "great harm" it caused. PETER W. HUBER,
GALILEO'S REVENGE: JUNK SCIENCE IN THE COURTROOM 152 (1991).
73. Irving J. Selikoff & E. Cuyler Hammond, Asbestos-associated Disease in United States
Shipyards, 28 CA: A CANCER JOURNAL FOR CLINICIANS 87, 90 (1978).
74. Joyce A. Lagnese, Economic Aspects of Mesothelioma, in MALIGNANT MESOTHELIOMA:
ADVANCES IN PATHENOGENESIS, DIAGNOSIS, AND TRANSLATIONAL THERAPIES 821, 821
(Harvey I. Pass et al. eds., 2005); see also supra note 57 and accompanying text.
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The strict-liability era that Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Products Corp.75
had launched in 1974 was well underway when, in 1993, the Supreme
Court interpreted Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence to hold that
trial judges must keep expert scientific evidence from juries unless they
deem that evidence valid. 76 Non-constitutional, not binding on state courts,
and written to clarify existing rules rather than herald a new right, Daubert
v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals showed little early promise of becoming
an attention-getter like another Harry Blackmun work product, Roe v.
Wade, but it grew large. Though twenty years younger than Roe, it has
more than twice as many citations in published decisional law.77
Commentary on the case, which is comparably vast, agrees that despite
the permissive tenor of the holding (i.e., establishing many criteria for
admissibility with no relative weight attached to each, rather than the
unitary criterion of United States v. Frye,78 the decision it overruled) and
the liberal pedigree of Justice Blackmun himself, Daubert functions to
restrict plaintiffs' personal injury claims. 79 Especially after the holding in a
later case, General Electric Co. v. Joiner,80 that trial courts enjoy latitude to
apply the Daubert criteria to litigants as they see fit, judges gained a
prerogative to look with deep skepticism at any new assertion that some
antecedent caused an effect. 81  Personal injury claims involving toxic
exposure post-Daubert have had to reckon with this judicial skepticism: a
plaintiff might possess good evidence about the dangerousness of a
substance and some evidence about the causal mechanism that hurt her-
and, of course, an injury-yet not reach a jury because of the trial judge's
doubts regarding causation.
82
Skeptical judges do not need Daubert to sustain their skepticism. The
competitor approach embodied in Frye, widely in use during the Borel era
and still followed in some states, imposes "general acceptance" as a
condition for admissibility.8 3 Under the Frye standard, scientific evidence
75. 493 F.2d 1076, 1092 (5th Cir. 1974).
76. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 590 (1993).
77. Searching Westlaw's ALLCASES database on January 31, 2008, I found 3567 citations
to Roe and 7629 to Daubert.
78. Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
79. Anita Bernstein, Products Liability in the United States Supreme Court: A Venture in
Memory of Gary Schwartz, 53 S.C. L. REV. 1193, 1217-18 (2002) (reviewing cases and
commentary); Edward K. Cheng & Albert H. Yoon, Does Frye or Daubert Matter? A Study of
Scientific Admissibility Standards, 91 VA. L. REV. 471, 473 (2005); Lisa Heinzerling, Doubting
Daubert, 14 J.L. & POL'Y 65, 69 (2006).
80. 522 U.S. 136 (1997).
81. See id. at 146.
82. See id.
83. Frye, 293 F. at 1014 (holding that expert testimony based on scientific knowledge is
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that is both valid and relevant is inadmissible unless the proponent can
show that it reflects a consensus of experts in the field.
84
Daubert on remand, sometimes called Daubert II, went on to add what
looks like another increment of skepticism facing the claims asbestos
plaintiffs and their lawyers make. 85 The Ninth Circuit, inquiring into the
validity of the proferred testimony, paused over whether the plaintiffs
experts were testifying about "research conducted independent of the
litigation." 86  Irving Selikoff's investigations of a connection between
asbestos exposure and lung disease were financed by the insulation
workers' union.87 Although this funding source long preceded successful
asbestos litigation, it suggests a partisan origin: unions have worked closely
with asbestos plaintiffs' lawyers, setting up screening programs to identify
asymptomatic lung disease in their rank and file.
88
Daubert II added another pertinent barrier when the Ninth Circuit
"deemed inadmissible the opinion of any plaintiff's expert who attempted
to draw a causal inference based on anything other than statistically
significant, peer reviewed, published epidemiological studies that showed a
relative risk above the background risk level of two or greater"89-a stance
that soon ended not only Jason Daubert's lawsuit but the Bendectin
litigation generally, and chilled plaintiffs' attempts to characterize other
substances as toxic; skepticism about causation became doctrine in new
ways. The Supreme Court had written Daubert to say what was admissible
evidence, not what would constitute sufficient evidence to support a
judgment. Lower courts, however, read its admissibility rule to hold
plaintiffs' experts to a sufficiency standard.90
In sum, whether they had to litigate under a Frye or a Daubert
approach to the scientific evidence that is needed to sustain the causation
admissible only if the proffered point is "sufficiently established to have gained general
acceptance in the particular field in which it belongs").
84. Id.
85. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 43 F.3d 1311 (9th Cir. 1995).
86. Id. at 1317.
87. Deborah R. Hensler & Mark A. Peterson, Understanding Mass Personal Injury
Litigation: A Socio-LegalAnalysis, 59 BROOK. L. REv. 961, 1023 n.310 (1993).
88. Albert H. Parnell, Medicolegal Aspects of Asbestos-Related Diseases: A Defense
Attorney 's Perspective, in PATHOLOGY OF ASBESTOS-ASSOCIATED DISEASES 377, 384 (Victor L.
Roggli et al. eds., 1992).
89. Lucinda M. Finley, Guarding the Gate to the Courthouse: How Trial Judges Are Using
Their Evidentiary Screening Role to Remake Tort Causation Rules, 49 DEPAUL L. REv. 335, 339
(1999).
90. Id. at 347-48; Brief of Amici Curiae Margaret A. Berger & Jerome P. Kassirer in Support
of Plaintiff-Appellant at 21-29, Rider v. Sandoz Pharms. Corp., 295 F.3d 1194 (1 1th Cir. 2002)
(No. 61-11965 BB and 01-CC).
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element of any personal injury claim, plaintiffs who brought actions for
toxic exposure proceeded under conditions of skepticism that rested on a
doctrinal foundation. A toxic substance claim demands scientific evidence
about causation, not just the tempting recourse to post hoc ergo propter
hoc.9' A plaintiff who brings a products liability action must also identify
the supplying defendant. 92 Epidemiological shortfalls, per Daubert II, can
destroy the claim.93 These daunting conditions, which make prevailing an
achievement for plaintiffs and their counsel in any toxic substance claim for
personal injury, imposed challenges on asbestos claimants and their
lawyers.94
B. The Asbestos Achievement: Holding Defendants Liable for Supplying
the Asbestos Linked to Mesothelioma
The esteemed products liability scholar Jane Stapleton notes the
extraordinary victory that asbestos plaintiffs enjoyed on causation doctrine
with respect to mesothelioma. 9' Recall that asbestos liability began with
Borel, brought by an asbestos installer who suffered from both asbestosis
and mesothelioma, a cancer that can manifest on the lungs but is not lung
cancer.96  When the author of Borel, Judge John Minor Wisdom, called
asbestos a cause of both asbestosis and mesothelioma,97 he elided what a
better etiology would have kept separate,98 and his error lies at the heart of
the causation question. Asbestosis, a scarring that clogs the airways of the
lungs, is dose-related, the result of cumulative exposures. 99 Breathe a little
asbestos and the asbestosis you will get, if you get it, is slight; breathe a lot
91. DAVID G. OWEN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY LAW 740 (2005).
92. Id. at 733 (stating the plaintiff's burden as having to prove "that the defendant is the
source of the challenged product").
93. Daubert, 43 F.3d at 1320-21.
94. OWEN, supra note 91, at 740-41.
95. Jane Stapleton, Two Causal Fictions at the Heart of US. Asbestos Doctrine, 122 L.Q.
REV. 189, 189-90 (2006).
96. The noted public intellectual Stephen Jay Gould suffered from mesothelioma for twenty
years before dying not of it, but of lung cancer.
97. Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Prods. Co., 493 F.2d 1076, 1083 (5th Cir. 1974).
98. See generally Michael D. Green, The Inability of Offensive Collateral Estoppel to Fulfill
its Promise: An Examination of Estoppel in Asbestos Litigation, 70 IOWA L. REV. 141, 165-66
(1984) [hereinafter Green, Collateral Estoppel] (calling the Fifth Circuit's Borel opinion
"imprecise, internally inconsistent, factually inaccurate, and infuriatingly vague .... The court
upheld a jury verdict that contained blatantly inconsistent findings and that made determinations
for which there was no rational basis.").
99. Stapleton, supra note 95, at 191.
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of asbestos and your asbestosis, if you get it, will be more severe. 00
"The severity of mesothelioma," however, like that of cancers
typically, "is not dose-related; it is an 'indivisible' disease. The method by
which it is contracted cannot therefore be a cumulative mechanism."' '
Conclusions that are obvious, at least to Stapleton, follow. Asbestosis and
mesothelioma are two separate diseases.1 °2 The former does not cause the
latter; responsibility for one does not necessarily entail responsibility for the
other. 10 3 Because mesothelioma is not dose-related, its cause must be either
what Stapleton calls a "single insult" or a "threshold mechanism."' '1 If the
single insult etiology is correct, the inhalation of one fiber of asbestos
bestows mesothelioma on a person, and all other inhaled fibers in his lungs
are ambient "noise," not necessary for his injury.' °5 If, alternatively, a
threshold explanation is correct, then a person remains free of
mesothelioma while inhaling asbestos until the total quantity he inhales
crosses a boundary, and then he develops the disease.
10 6
Science does not know whether the single insult or the threshold
explanation for mesothelioma is the right one. Nevertheless, starting with
Borel, courts have allowed plaintiffs to proceed implicitly on an
unexplored, unproven threshold theory, holding suppliers liable on a
"substantial factor" approach to causation10°7-in other words, presuming
that the increment of asbestos that they each supplied carried the plaintiff
over his threshold-even though plaintiffs do not possess the scientific
knowledge necessary to establish the accuracy of the threshold theory, the
only etiology that can save their mesothelioma claims.
Like the procedural triumphs reviewed in the last Part, 108 this victory
for plaintiffs over their Daubert/Frye evidentiary shortcomings illustrates
how strong lawyering overcomes the poor hand that clients are dealt. "To
collect in a 'meso' case," a recent chapter on toxics litigation concludes,
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Calling this purported etiology "a matter of considerable controversy even today,"
Michael Green reviews the evidence in Green, Asbestos Apportionment, supra note 6, at 318 n. 13.
Given that "[ilt is universally accepted that the amount of asbestos exposure needed to cause
asbestosis is greater than the amount needed to cause mesothelioma," Laura S. Welch et al.,
Asbestos Exposure Causes Mesothelioma, But Not This Asbestos Exposure, 13 INT'L J.
OCCUPATIONAL & ENVTL. HEALTH 318, 322 (2007), I see no reason to suppose that asbestosis
causes mesothelioma.
104. Stapleton, supra note 95, at 191-92.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Borel, 493 F.2d at 1094.
108. See supra Part II.A.
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"the plaintiffs' lawyer has only to identify one or more viable defendants to
whose products the plaintiff was, arguably, exposed."109  This victory
wasn't supposed to happen. Through its preponderance standard, tort law
purports to saddle toxic tort plaintiffs rather than defendants with the
misfortune of scientific uncertainty. If the single insult etiology in fact
explains mesothelioma, then any court that found, in ruling for a plaintiff,
any individual defendant supplier liable (when multiple defendants in fact
exposed the plaintiff to asbestos) misapplied the preponderance standard,
and reached the wrong answer. Observers of the liability record must
render credit where it is due.
III. APPORTIONMENT ACHIEVEMENTS
One scholar of both asbestos liability and apportionment returns us
again to the ancestral Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Products Corp.,' l1 this
time as an apportionment achievement for plaintiffs. Clarence Borel named
eleven corporations as defendants.111 The Fifth Circuit upheld a jury
verdict that the non-settling defendants were all jointly and severally liable
for Borel's lung diseases, 12 because of their failure to warn him.113 This
aggregation swept together several entities that stood in different places vis-
A-vis the plaintiff: for example, three defendants started to provide warnings
in 1964, five years before Borel retired.1 14  The court held them liable
anyway, on the ground that by 1964, Borel's condition was irreversible.
115
Yet it also held the post-1964 suppliers liable, an inconsistency that worked
entirely in the plaintiff s favor, and whose effects endure:
16
The basic apportionment approach of Borel... has continued for the past
thirty years. All defendants to whose defective asbestos products a
plaintiff has been exposed are jointly and severally liable for the plaintiff s
harm unless, pursuant to section 433B(2) of the Second Restatement, a
109. G. William Shaw & Warner J. Miller, Special Cases: Asbestos Litigation, in Toxic TORT
LITIGATION 349, 356 (Alan Rudlin ed., 2007).
110. 493 F.2d at 1095.
111. BRODEUR, supra note 5, at 40-41. Michael Green counts 10, however. Green, Asbestos
Apportionment, supra note 6, at 321. The decision unhelpfully says "Fibreboard Paper Products
Corporation, et al."
112. Borel, 493 F.2d at 1096.
113. Id. at 1091 (stating "the failure to give adequate warnings in such circumstances can
render the product unreasonably dangerous").
114. Id. at 1104 (explaining that Johns-Manville placed a warning label on packages of its
products in 1964).
115. Id. at 1105.
116. Green, Asbestos Apportionment, supra note 6, at 319-20.
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defendant can establish that it caused somethinf7less than the entirety of
the plaintiffs harm. Of course, they rarely can.
Asbestosis and lung cancer present separate manifestations of this victory.
A. The Asbestosis Apportionment Achievement
As was just mentioned, breathe a little asbestos and the asbestosis you
will get, if you get it, is slight; breathe a lot of asbestos and your asbestosis,
if you get it, will be more severe. This pattern means that unlike
mesothelioma, an "indivisible" injury," 8 asbestosis is amenable to
apportionment.19 A defendant supplier identified as a non-exclusive source
of exposure should be obliged to pay only for the share of the plaintiffs
asbestosis attributable to what it supplied, not the entire injury. Case law
and Restatements are all in accord on this point.
120
Nevertheless, courts typically spare asbestosis plaintiffs the rigors of
apportionment once they conclude that the quantity of asbestos that the
defendants supplied was more than trivial. One application of this
permissive outlook appears in the Supreme Court's most recent asbestos
decision, where a plaintiff had been exposed to the defendant's asbestos for
only three months and had worked with the substance elsewhere for thirty-
three-years; the defendant was held liable for the plaintiffs entire condition
of asbestosis.1 21 Commenting from Britain, one practicing lawyer attributes
this pro-plaintiff outcome to more energetic advocacy on the plaintiffs'
side. 122
117. Id. at 320-21 (citations omitted). Green adds that a "trivial contribution doctrine" now
releases some defendants from responsibility. Id. at 325.
118. Stapleton, supra note 95, at 191.
119. See id. (explaining while this "indivisible injury" treatment accords with the scientific
reality of mesothelioma it involves a dramatic "fiction" when applied to asbestosis).
120. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 433B (1965); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
TORTS: APPORTIONMENT OF LIABILITY § A19 (2000) and cases cited therein.
121. Stapleton, supra note 95, at 193, citing Norfolk & Western Rwy v. Ayers, 538 U.S. 135,
143 (2003).
122. "Apportionment of damages is the area which defendants need to concentrate on. If they
ignore it then the future is grim from their point of view." Andrew Hogarth, Apportionment: A
New and Better Defence to Asbestos Claims? at 18 (n.d.), available at
http://64.233.169.104/search?q=cache:nxC4OK2qNIIJ:www. 12kbw.co.uk/docs/Apportionment%
2520-%2520a%2520new%2520and%2520better/o2520defence%2520to%2520asbestos%2520
claims%2520-%252OAndrew/o252OHogarth%2520QC.doc+andrew+hogarth+apportionrment:+A+
new+and+better+defense+to+asbestos+claims&hl=en&ct-clnk&cd=l&gl=us; see also id. at 11
(noting that "[n]o defendant has ever sought to apportion damages" to reflect its own proportional
contribution to the plaintiff's injury, and "[it is very difficult to see why they have not at least
attempted to do so").
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B. The Achievement for Lung Cancer Plaintiffs Who Were Smokers When
They Were Exposed to Asbestos
Although the comprehensive and much-cited RAND studies of
asbestos liability curiously do not count the proportion of plaintiffs whose
lungs were also exposed to tobacco, asbestos workers have long had a
reputation for heavy smoking.123  Those who brought actions for lung
cancer might have expected to suffer in court for having chosen to inhale a
significantly more potent carcinogen. Some of them did.2 4  The folksy
plaintiffs' lawyer Ronald Motley, who had a cute trick-and-anecdote to
dispel jury prejudice against plaintiffs who had smoked and sued for
asbestosis, 125 reported that he felt close to helpless before his jury whenever
he represented a smoker-plaintiff with lung cancer.1
26
It is far from obvious how to assign responsibility in response to a
claim by a plaintiff who, following exposure to both asbestos and cigarette
smoke, developed lung cancer and brought an action against an asbestos
supplier, or, as is more frequently the case, and for further complication,
asbestos suppliers. The toxic torts scholar Gerald Boston, noting that both
substances cause lung cancer, states the uncertainty in dramatic terms:
123. BRODEUR, supra note 5, at 225 (calling cigarette smoking "a habit that appears to have
been indulged in by a great majority of asbestos workers"); Hooper, supra note 71 (observing that
"the vast majority" of asbestos workers smoked). When one notorious asbestos manufacturer
tried in the 1970s to prohibit smoking in its Texas plant and impose disciplinary sanctions on
workers who defied the ban, its union contended that this policy violated its collective bargaining
agreement, and the Fifth Circuit sided with the union, "notwithstanding uncontroverted evidence
that asbestos workers who smoke are ninety-two times more likely to die of lung cancer than those
who do not." Frances H. Miller, Biological Monitoring: The Employer's Dilemma, 9 AM. J. L. &
MED. 387, 425 n. 181 (1984) (citing Johns-Manville Sales Corp. v. Int'l Ass'n of Machinists, 621
F.2d 756 (5th Cir. 1980)).
124. See, e.g., Zarow-Smith v. N.J. Transit Rail Operations, 953 F. Supp. 581, 585-86 (D.N.J.
1997) (upholding comparative-responsibility apportionment in a FELA action); Brisboy v.
Fibreboard Corp., 418 N.W. 2d 650, 655 (Mich. 1988) (holding that because the smoker-worker
plaintiff had assumed the risk of lung cancer, he had to accept a reduction in his damages).
125. See BRODEUR, supra note 5, at 234 (relating that Motley would routinely advise his
clients to stop smoking, and that he found smoking "far and away the most difficult" attribute of a
plaintiffto overcome before a jury). Asbestosis claims involving smokers could be handled more
easily:
My strategy for dealing with the cigarette-smoking issue [in an asbestosis case] is to get to it
early and keep it out front. For example, before beginning my opening statement I place a
carton of cigarettes in an empty chair and proceed to inform the jury that I am going to tell
them a story about a culprit called asbestos, but that my opponent is going to try this case
against cigarettes ... I talk a lot about a guard dog at an asbestos-textile factory in Great
Britain that died of asbestosis ... When they autopsied the poor thing, they found his lungs
to be riddled with scar tissue caused by his inhalation of asbestos fibers. That was way back
in 1933. But I get a lot of mileage out of it with juries for the simple reason that the dog
didn't smoke-now did he?
Quoted in BRODEUR, supra note 5, at 235.
126. Id. at 234.
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[Any two individual plaintiffs] who were exposed to comparable levels of
asbestos would stand on equal footing as to their ability to demonstrate
that asbestos exposure caused his or her lung cancer, even though one was
a chronic smoker and the other a nonsmoker. Asbestos exposure multiplies
the incidence of background lung cancer in all cases, whether or not the
background includes smoking. A relative risk of about 5.0 translates into
an etiological probability of 80%, meaning that exposure to asbestos
causes 80% of the lung cancers among smokers and 80% of the lung
cancers within the nonsmoking group.127
And yet, Boston continues, a court cannot simply impose liability on
the asbestos supplier(s) and go home, because smokers have a relative risk
of approximately 10.0 when compared to nonsmokers. 28 For a person who
smoked, and also inhaled asbestos, and then developed lung cancer,
paradoxically enough, the probability that smoking caused his cancer is
90% and the probability that asbestos caused his cancer is 80%. Courts
thus face a variation on the classic twin fires problem of tort law, where one
fire attributable to the negligence of defendant X, big enough to cause all
the damage the plaintiff suffered, had, before touching the plaintiffs
property, merged with another fire attributable to the negligence of
defendant Y, which also started out big enough to cause all the damage.
129
Although both defendants X and Y escape responsibility under a "but for"
test for actual cause, the uncontroversial tort rule is that both can be liable
for the entire loss.
130
Even if asbestos and cigarette smoke could be considered twins for this
analysis, however, apportionment is not the same as causation; or, as
Boston puts the point, "if courts could attribute to each fire some dimension
of magnitude (that is, a relative risk)[,] they could rationally apportion the
harm among these multiple causes."' 3' However the synergy between these
two poisons may function, one of them plainly outweighs and exceeds the
other as a source of lung cancer.132
127. Gerald W. Boston, Toxic Apportionment: A Causation and Risk Contribution Model, 25
ENVTL. L. 549, 575 (1995).
128. Id.
129. Id. at 630 (quoting Anderson v. Minneapolis, St. P. & S. Ste. M. Ry., 179 N.W. 45
(Minn. 1920)).
130. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 432(2) cmt. d, illus. 3 (1979).
131. Boston, supra note 127, at 576.
132. See F.D.K. Liddell & B.G. Armstrong, The Combination of Effects on Lung Cancer of
Cigarette Smoking and Exposure in Quebec Chrysotile Miners and Millers, 46 ANN. OCCUP.
HYG. 5, 5 (2002) (summarizing evidence showing that the effect is independent rather than
synergistic).
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Yet apportionment on a risk-contribution basis remains rare. 133 In his
study of post-Borel developments in apportionment, Michael Green finds
three judicial approaches to cancer claims that combine asbestos exposure
with exposure to cigarette smoke. 34  Courts in the first group assess the
relative contribution of each input (asbestos and smoking) to the risk of
cancer.13 1 Courts in the second group refuse to take the smoking into
account. 136 The third approach is to look at smoking as a plaintiffs conduct
defense, requiring the defendant to prove that the plaintiffs smoking was
negligent. 137
The first grouping appears neutral between defendants and plaintiffs
(with Green's important reminder-caveat that in order to count, the cigarette
smoking, whether done by the plaintiff or third parties, must have been
wrongful). But this approach is not a majority rule. The second recasts
reality to favor plaintiffs. The third, which shifts the costs of non-
production to defendants, also appears relatively neutral, but has often
proved too demanding for these suppliers to overcome.13 8  Score another
victory for able lawyers.
IV. CONCLUSION
Reviewing the attacks heaped on lawyers who represented asbestos
plaintiffs brings out a few accusations that have not been made. For all the
vitriol flung, no one has charged that these advocates intimidated the
judiciary into submission. They did not win their victories by violence. It
was not they who killed the cheaper alternative of a legislative solution to
133. See Boston, supra note 127, at 576 (explaining that few courts have actually apportioned
the harm in a similar fashion).
134. Green, Asbestos Apportionment, supra note 6, at 324.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 333.
138. Id. at 324 n.40 (putting in the third category Rutherford v. Owens-Illinois, Inc., 941 P.2d
1203 (Cal. 1997), which affirmed an improbable jury determination that the decedent's fault in
maintaining a pack-a-day smoking habit for 30 years contributed only 2.5% to his lung cancer);
Altiere v. Fibreboard Corp., 617 A.2d 1302, 1303 (Pa. Super. 1992) (fear-of-cancer case with
present asbestosis featuring a plaintiff who "was a heavy smoker;" the court refused an
apportionment instruction because the statistical evidence on what inputs cause which cancers was
too imprecise). In another favorable-to-the-plaintiff case not cited by Green, one court declared
that "for smoking to be considered contributory negligence, it must be shown that the plaintiff had
subjective knowledge of the synergistic relationship between the asbestos-related disease and
smoking and appreciated the danger of continued smoking." Cimino v. Raymark Indus., 751 F.
Supp. 649, 658 (E.D. Tex. 1990).
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the asbestos crisis, even though they had a stake in warding it off.139
With no misbehaviors by lawyers quite so dramatic to condemn, critics
of these successes have focused on falsity as a constituent of asbestos
claims. This Article has taken no position on the merits of these
accusations. For purposes of noting asbestos achievements, however, it
bears mention that while lies told in litigation will always be a serious threat
to justice that no observer can responsibly shrug off, those critics who
complained about dishonest tactics-perjury, witness coaching, the
corruption of witnesses---described conduct relatively amenable to repair by
forensic means. Opponents can cross-examine lying witnesses, report
perjury and have it prosecuted, and take action to set aside judgments that
rest on fraud.
To an outsider who holds no affinity for either asbestos claimants or
their enemies, the bulk of the attack on asbestos plaintiffs' lawyers seems
focused on its resentment of them for their having made and spent a
fortune. Yachts! Private jets! Campaign contributions! The commentary
expresses revulsion for the indecent profits reaped from the misfortunes of
sick, or at least poison-exposed, working people.
1 40
In this context, the products liability and mass torts scholar George
Priest-who prefers to call the asbestos status quo a "phenomenon" rather
than a "crisis," only because to him, "crisis" "implies a newly emergent or
immediate form of distress" 41 -renders asbestos plaintiffs' lawyers an
extraordinary if unintended compliment. Priest writes that "the law relating
to asbestos claims" installed "a distinct recovery system, different in
multiple respects from the basic system of law and procedure that addresses
all other areas of injury.' 1 42 In his observation,
the asbestos law system has:
1) relaxed the requirement of proving demonstrated injury by allowing
suits and recoveries by exposure-only claimants, by claimants alleging no
more than a fear of injury, and by claimants desiring monitoring for the
detection of a potential injury;
2) relaxed the causation requirement of carefully identifying the source of
139. See Mark Behrens, Judicial and Practical Perspectives: Transcript of Mark Behrens 51
(Jan. 18, 2008) (attributing the failure of a congressional solution to infighting on the defense side)
(unpublished transcript, on file with the Southwestern University Law Review); Barnes, supra
note 9, at 158.
140. See, e.g., Marc Galanter, Predators and Parasites: Lawyer-Bashing and Civil Justice, 28
GA. L. REv. 633, 634 (1994) (organizing a "taxonomy of anti-lawyer themes" including
complaints "that lawyers are: (1) corrupters of discourse; (2) fomenters of strife; (3) betrayers of
trust; or (4) economic predators").
141. George L. Priest, The Cumulative Sources of the Asbestos Litigation Phenomenon, 31
PEPP. L. REv. 261, 261 (2003).
142. Id. at 265-66.
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the injury. More specifically, the asbestos law system has relaxed the tort
law requirement of showing that the injurer could have prevented the
injury in some practicable way. Most claims today proceed on a failure-to-
warn theory, which is largely fanciful with respect to actual prevention,
since it can hardly be believed that warnings, if issued, would have
effectively eliminated the risk of injury;
3) provided damages in amounts substantially greater than awarded for
identical injuries in other accident contexts. In an empirical study in
progress, I have found that, in wrongful death cases, recoveries for
asbestos-related losses are multiples greater than recoveries for equivalent
losses (deaths) suffered in other contexts;
4) expanded the concept of joint and several liability beyond its particular
deterrent function and vastly reduced the requirement of showing
causative links, again eliminating any relationship to a standard that would
compel a showing that a defendant could have prevented the injury;
5) provided punitive damages in magnitudes greater than in other accident
contexts and greater than could possibly be justified by the deterrence
rationale. Indeed, punitive damages in asbestos cases have turned the
justification for that institution on its head. Punitive damages can be
justified only where it is believed that compensatory damages alone will
be insufficient to fully internalize injury costs to defendants. Punitive
damages continue to be awarded in magnitudes that threaten the prospect
of recovering compensatory damages for thousands of claimants;
6) vastly expanded the obligations of insurers by negating insurer
constraints on coverage in a variety of ways. These include ignoring the
significance of the policy period by adopting forms of continuous trigger,
expanding claims periods, allowing direct actions, and adopting many
other coverage-expanding definitions that essentially break down the
operation of the basic commercial general liability policy;
7) ameliorated the concept of litigation finality through the second injury
doctrine;
8) relaxed a variety of procedural rules, such as venue standards and
forum non conveniens, and adopted novel aggregative mechanisms that
cannot be justified either as promoting efficienF of process or as making
possible the litigation of negative-value claims. 4
Gee, one might wonder, how'd all that happen? Priest answers this
question by saying the changes "have resulted from concerns about
asbestos-related losses," as if these concerns needed no champions to bring
them to the fore.144 The subject of all his eight sentences is "the system."' 145
Consistent with a prevailing view that asbestos liability is a force of
nature, sudden and unruly like a tsunami, the Supreme Court has called this
litigation an elephantine mass. 146 One student commentator gathers more
143. Id. at 266-67.
144. Id. at 267.
145. Id.
146. Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 821 (1999).
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metaphors: Courts and observers equate it with "a rising tide... a flood...
a torrent... a tidal wave.., an avalanche.., a massive, unending river...
a cauldron of sticky, bubbly, and ill-smelling trouble." 141 Onward through
a final metaphoric crescendo: "the Apocalyptic Beast."'
48
Florid imagery about the unstoppable nature of Nature should not
obscure a hard-fought succession of victories that workaday human
initiative built. Asbestos liability (if we may tarry a moment preserving
George Priest's passive diction) reveals clients who were retained and
compensated. Antagonists were won over. Claims were strengthened by
aggregation. Settlements were negotiated. Procedural hurdles were
overcome. Evidentiary rules were made more permissive. Statutes of
limitation, the province of legislatures, were revised by judges in a plaintiff-
favoring direction. Hazards were exposed. Large business corporations
were brought to their knees.
Lawyers advocating for clients effected these achievements. They
rewrote the law of civil procedure and torts, bringing redress to clients who
had started out obstructed by conservative rules and presumptions. One
may debate the merits of their doctrinal innovations; but at a minimum,
their victories suggest new opportunities to other persons hurt by
negligence and defective products. Even if one grants that these lawyers
were as relentless, dishonest, and greed-crazed as their foes say-for the
record, I will say here I doubt it-they set a record for achievement that, in
magnitude, surpasses what almost anyone else in the history of American
civil justice has ever accomplished.
147. Matthew C. Stiegler, Note, The Uncertain Future of Limited Fund Settlement Class
Actions After Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 78 N.C. L. REv. 856, 856 n.2 (2000).
148. This final metaphor comes from Eagle-Picher Indus. v. Balbos, 578 A.2d 228, 231 (Md.
Ct. Spec. App. 1990) (quoting VICENTE BLASCO IBANEZ, THE FOUR HORSEMEN OF THE
APOCALYPSE 172 (Charlotte Brewster Jordan trans., 1918)), affd in part and rev'd in part, 604
A.2d 445 (Md. 1992). Id.
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